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COMMENT.
The following summary of the effect of the recent Aot of
Congress creating the Circuit Court of Appeals was given by
Professor Baldwin of the Yale Law School in his address, as
president of the American Bar Association, at its Boston meeting,
in August last.
"That this law will, in a few years, greatly reduce the busi-
ness of the Supreme Court there can be no doubt, nor can there
be any that this result will be accomplished only by serious sacri-
fices. That great branch or, it might be said, trunk of its
jurisdiction, which consists of controversies between citizens of
different States, is cut away, except so far as points of special
difficulty may be sent up, by the action of the new Court, or
called up by the action of the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court loses also, with similar exceptions, its right of review in
patent, revenue and admiralty causes, other than prize. It gains
jurisdiction to reverse all criminal convictions, whether in the
Circuit or District Court, for an infamous offence (that is one for
which imprisonment in a penitentiary might be awarded), and is
likely to be freely appealed to in cases of this character.
" Hereafter, this tribunal can be asked to review all questions
as to the jurisdiction of the Circuit or District Courts (except so
far as this may be affected by the statute as to the remand of a
cause improperly removed*), decrees in prize causes, convictions
of infamous crimes, and decisions on points of constitutional con-
struction. It has also appellate jurisdiction over a narrow class
of cases in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Of these, one of the
most important would seem to be appeals from Territorial Courts.
All these must now be brought primarily to the Circuit Courts of
Appeal, but subject to- a second appeal from their decision, in
cases involving over $i,ooo.
"Any questions of law arising in controversies between citi-
zens of different States, or any other of the classes of cases within
the final jurisdiction of the new Court, may be brought before the
Supreme Court, at its desire or if specially certified up by the
Court below.
* 25 U. S. Stat, at Large, p. 435; Act of Aug. 13, 3888.
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"How far this extraordinary grant of jurisdiction will be
pursued must be determined by the future practice of both Courts,
in view of what may be the demands of public sentiment. That
the Supreme Court would call up any case coming to their atten-
tion where unsound doctrine on matters of general commercial
laws had been announced, may safely be predicted, and if they
allow counsel for the defeated party to move for the issue of a
writ of certiorari, without restriction, such applications are likely
to be not infrequent.
" This law introduces one new feature into our Federal pro-
cedure-an appeal (to the Circuit Court of Appeals) from an order
for a temporary injunction.
"The general appellate jurisdiction of the new Court also
removes what had become, since the adoption of the $5,000 limit
for ordinary appeals to the Supreme Court, a serious grievance,-
the absolute power of a single Judge in most cases in the Circuit
Court."
We lay down Mr. Cook's little book, entitled "The Corpora-
tion Problem," with a desire to put to the author the question:
" What is the corporation problem ?" We find problems as to
railroad rates, which would be substantially the same if railroads
were operated by individuals. We find problems as to combina-
tions of capital and -business, which do not require incorporation.
We read of strikes, and they are not confined to business under
corporate management. It is suggested that there should be
some limitation upon the freedom with which railroad franchises,
and other like franchises, are granted by the State; such franchises
are acquired only by a very few of the many classes of corpora-
tions. But there does not remain in our minds, as suggested by
this book, any problem which is distinctively the corporation prob-
lem in the sense that it is at once peculiar to corporations and
common to corporations of all classes. It seems to us that the
tendency of Mr. Cook's book is to encourage rather than to dissi-
pate the common notion that many evils not peculiar to corpora-
tions, and many others not common to corporations of all classes,
are chargeable generally against incorporation. And we venture
to say that there is no notion of greater potentiality that this for
error in common thought, and so for error in judicial decisions and
legislative action.
A recent case in New Hampshire, Woodmian v. Prescott, considers
the question of whether the entry of a nollep rosequi is a sufficient
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termination of a criminal suit to allow the party prosecuted to
commence an action for malicious prosecution. In Massachusetts
it is held that such an entry is not necessarily sufficient, and it is
said, "that whether a prosecution has been so terminated as to
authorize the party prosecuted to commence an action for mali-
cious prosecution is to be determined by the facts of the particular
case, of which facts the entry of a nolleprosequi may be one of sev-
eral, may be the only fact, may be a controlling fact, or may be
an entirely unimportant one. Graves v. Dawson, 130 Mass. 78.
In Langford v. R. R. CO., 144 Mass. 431, Chief Justice Morton
says: "The entry of a nolle prosequi by the district attorney of his
own motion, followed by a discharge of the accused party by the
court, may be such a termination of the prosecution as will enable
the party to maintain an action for malicious prosecution." In
other jurisdictions it is held to be sufficient. In Agar v. Woolston,
43 N. J. Law, 57, it is said: "Except to confer on the accused
the capacity to sue, the manner in which the prosecution termi-
nated is immaterial. The law requires only that the particular
prosecution complained of shall have been terminated, and not
that the liability of the plaintiff to prosecution for the same offense
shall have been extinguished before the action for malicious pros-
ecution is brought. Consequently the refusal of the grand jury
to find an indictment, a nolle prosequi, or any proceeding by which
the particular prosecution is disposed of, in such a manner that it
cannot be revived, and that the prosecutor, if he intends to pro-
ceed further, must institute proceedings de novo, is a sufficient ter-
mination of the prosecution to enable the plaintiff to bring his
action." Judge Cooley says : "The reasonable rule seems to be
that the technical prerequisite is only that the particular prosecu-
tion be disposed of in such a manner that this cannot be revived,
and the prosecutor, if he proceeds further, will be put to a new
one." The rule in New Hampshire is declared to be that if the
proceeding has been terminated in the plaintiff's favor without
procurement or compromise on his part, in such a manner that it
cannot be revived, it is a sufficient termination to enable him to
bring an action for a malicious prosecution.
Texas furnishes a curious illustration of the conclusions some-
times reached by legal presumptions. Its Supreme Court recently
held that inasmuch as in refefence to marriage the common
law has never prevailed in Texas, neither could it be pre-
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sumed, in the absence of proof, that the common law was ever in
force in the Chickasaw Nation. It follows that, in that case, if
Massachusetts or Connecticut law had been called in question the
same doctrine would have been applied: New England doomed to
Justinian's Code by a Texas presumption would be an interesting
subject to contemplate.
In Mellor v. fissouri Pacific Railway Co., i6 S. W. Rep.
849, decided last June, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a
mail clerk is a passenger so far as a railway company's liability
for injury is concerned.
